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A puzzle about ontological commitments

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Citation

Ebert P (2008) A puzzle about ontological commitments. Philosophia Mathematica, 16 (2), pp. 209-226. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm050

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to scrutinise the necessary conditions for a specific mathematical principle to be ontologically committing and, as such, to identify the source of its ontological commitments. The principle in ques- tion is Hume¡¯s Principle ¨C a statement that embedded in second-order logic allows for a deduction of the second-order Peano axioms. This principle is at the heart of the so-called Neo-Fregean programme as defended by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright. Once it is clear what the source of the commitment to infinitely many ob jects of Hume¡¯s Principle is, we should be able to re-evaluate the debate between the Neo-Fregeans ¨C who defend Hume¡¯s Principle as an analytic principle ¨C and the so-called epistemic rejectionists ¨C who deny its analytic status. The conclusions can then be generalised to other abstraction principles, principle that share a similar form to Hume¡¯s Principle. In the first section, I will clarify what epistemic rejectionism is committed to and provide a theoretical basis for the position by introducing the notion of presumptuousness as the underlying criterion on the basis of which Hume¡¯s Principle is to be rejected as an analytic principle. Then, in section 2 and 3, I will review certain formal results which prima facie put pressure on epistemic rejectionism. In section 4, I will propose a short thought-experiment to highlight the problem for epistemic rejectionism posed by the formal results and then suggest various responses on behalf of the epistemic rejectionist. The upshot will be to elicit a new and very basic disagreement between epistemic rejectionism and the Neo-Fregeans which will provide a new angle to properly assess and re-evaluate the current debate.

Keywords
Abstractionism; ontological commitments; Neo-Fregeanism; apriori; analyticity; Hume's Principle

Journal
Philosophia Mathematica: Volume 16, Issue 2

StatusPublished
Publication date31/12/2008
URL
PublisherOxford University Press
ISSN0031-8019
eISSN1744-6406

People (1)

Professor Philip Ebert

Professor Philip Ebert

Professor, Philosophy

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