Article
Details
Citation
Specker Sullivan L & Niker F (2018) Relational Autonomy, Paternalism, and Maternalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21 (3), pp. 649-667. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9900-z
Abstract
The concept of paternalism is intricately tied to the concept of autonomy. It is commonly assumed that when paternalistic interventions are wrong, they are wrong because they impede individuals¡¯ autonomy. Our aim in this paper is to show that the recent shift towards conceiving of autonomy relationally highlights a separate conceptual space for a nonpaternalistic kind of interpersonal intervention termed maternalism. We argue that maternalism makes a twofold contribution to the debate over the ethics of interpersonal action and decision-making. Descriptively, it captures common experiences that, while not unusual in everyday life, are largely absent from the present discussion. Normatively, it describes a type of intervention with justification conditions distinct from the standard framework of paternal-ism. We explicate these contributions by describing six key differences between maternalism and paternalism, and conclude by anticipating and responding to potential objections.
Keywords
autonomy; relational autonomy; paternalism; maternalism; care ethics;
Journal
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: Volume 21, Issue 3
Status | Published |
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Publication date | 30/06/2018 |
Publication date online | 01/06/2018 |
Date accepted by journal | 21/05/2018 |
URL | |
Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC |
ISSN | 1386-2820 |
eISSN | 1572-8447 |
People (1)
Lecturer, Philosophy